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Abstract
What ontology does realism about the quantum state suggest? The main
extant view in contemporary philosophy of physics is wave-function real-
ism. We elaborate the sense in which wave-function realism does provide
an ontological picture; and defend it from certain objections that have
been raised against it. However, there are good reasons to be dissatis-
fied with wave-function realism, as we go on to elaborate. This motivates
the development of an opposing picture: what we call spacetime state re-
alism; a view which takes the states associated to spacetime regions as
fundamental. This approach enjoys a number of beneficial features, al-
though, unlike wave-function realism, it involves non-separability at the
level of fundamental ontology. We investigate the pros and cons of this
non-separability, arguing that it is a quite acceptable feature; even one
which proves fruitful in the context of relativistic covariance. A companion
paper discusses the prospects for combining a spacetime-based ontology
with separability, along lines suggested by Deutsch and Hayden
1 Introduction
In this paper we address two main questions: Suppose one were a realist about
quantum mechanics; and suppose, in addition, that in the version of quantum
mechanics one was committed to, the state is to be understood as standing for
some thing in the world. How is one to think of what the world is like in that
case? What is it that the state stands for? This is our first question.
Our second follows on. Quantum mechanics is well-known for its nonlocal
features; for its failure to satisfy a principle of separability. Quantum states
might, generically, be non-separable; but given an answer to our first question,
will it be true that the thing thereby represented (however we are to think of
it) is non-separable too? That is, when we are more careful to specify what the
ontology associated with realism about the quantum state is, will that ontology
satisfy separability, or not?
There has been remarkably little discussion of what the correct way of think-
ing about the ontology of the quantum state is. Here we develop an approach
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which we term spacetime state realism, in opposition to wave-function realism,
which has so far been the default option; apparently for want of alternatives.
We begin (Section 2) by sketching some requirements on specifying an on-
tology for quantum mechanics, and go on to introduce wave-function realism
(Section 3), indicating how it meets these requirements. But there are good
reasons to resist wave-function realism: it is plausible only in the restricted
setting of fixed-particle number non-relativistic quantum mechanics and it has
no reasonable extension to more physically realistic situations (Section 4). We
therefore develop a position which avoids these problems, taking states of space-
time regions as the primary elements (Section 5); and we enumerate its benefits
over wave-function realism.
What of separability (Section 6)? The spacetime state ontology is unambigu-
ously non-separable: the state of a given spacetime region will not be determined
by the states of the sub-regions of which it is composed. By contrast, however,
the wave-function ontology is separable at the fundamental level. This marks
a significant difference between these ontological pictures, but we go on to ar-
gue that the failure of separability is by no means a pathological feature of our
preferred account. Rather, it is a feature which has active benefits when one
comes to consider relativistic covariance and an important phenomenon recently
noted by David Albert, that quantum mechanics exhibits so-called narratability
failure (Section 8).
Our primary concern here is with realist accounts of quantum mechanics
that involve purely unitary evolution, thus the Everett interpretation will loom
large; however a number of our remarks will apply equally to other kinds of
theories which take the quantum state seriously as an element of reality, such as
Bohm-like hidden variable theories and dynamical collapse theories. We consider
the matter of non-unitary dynamics within our spacetime state ontology in
Section 7.
In a companion paper (Wallace and Timpson [2009]) we explore the mat-
ter of separability in more detail; and investigate the remarkable possibility
held out by Deutsch and Hayden ([2000]) that one may gain the benefits of a
spacetime-based approach to quantum ontology while retaining separability at
the fundamental level.
2 Prolegomena
What ontology does quantum theory prescribe? Historically, finding an answer
has not proven easy, for a variety of reasons. One way at least to set foot on a
path to an answer is by beginning with the question of what in general might be
involved in specifying an ontology associated with a physical theory. We have no
wish to be prescriptive, but it seems reasonable to agree that at least one way in
which an ontology may be specified (at least minimally) is by identifying suitable
bearers for the properties that the theory trades in, and then going on to say
something more about those properties themselves. The austere mathematically
framed description of these properties provided by theoretical physics might,
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on its own, seem a little thin: one would also like to be in a position to say
something about how they relate to the everyday world of moderately sized
objects which surrounds us. It is, however, notoriously difficult to provide a
satisfactory story about any of these various elements when discussing quantum
theory. Potential bearers and properties that one might identify generally seem
too rebarbatively alien to get a good grip on; and the problem of measurement
casts a long shadow over the question of recovering appearances (see Wallace
([2008]) for a review).
But what might be required in order to gain at least a reasonable grip on
a proposed ontology? We should be be wary of setting our sights too high and
insisting on too much when trying to ponder what fundamental physics presents
us with. Consider, for example, a simpler case: that of electromagnetism.
We are happy enough that electromagnetism does not present us with an
irredeemably obscure picture of the world, yet it is not as if we really have an
intuitive grasp of what an electric or a magnetic field is, other than indirectly and
by means of instrumental considerations (“A test charge would be accelerated
thus.”, for example). But in the case of field theory, we do at least understand
that “the electric field at spacetime point p” denotes a property of point p,1 and
this gives us substantial intuitive understanding of how to think about that field:
namely, it describes certain, admittedly somewhat alien, properties of spacetime
regions.
Does electromagnetism offer any further elucidation of its ontology, beyond
an assignment of vectorial quantities to spacetime points? We think not: what
could that understanding derive from? All we have to work with are the math-
ematical structure of the theory and the instrumental considerations alluded to
above—and the latter, when one takes seriously the idea of physics as universal,
ultimately collapse into interactions between the electromagnetic field and other
comparably alien entities. (It may help here to recall that matter, in the sense
of the macroscopic material bodies we observe, consist of, and manipulate in
the lab, cannot ultimately be thought of as some non-electromagnetic entity on
which electromagnetic forces act: modern physics makes clear that solid matter
is made up of electromagnetic fields as well as fermionic matter. In any case, the
latter is scarcely less alien than the former. Even if we naively regard fermions
as classical point particles, “point particles” are shapeless, colourless, texture-
less entities with little in common with familiar macroscopic bodies, for all that
schoolbook physics may have acclimatised us to them.)
Thus it seems that we gain a basic understanding of the electromagnetic field
by seeing it as a property of spatial regions2; and our further understanding
must be mediated by reflecting on its role in the theory (including, importantly,
the instrumental considerations); beyond that there doesn’t seem to be much
1Strictly speaking, assigning a vectorial quantity to a point will also involve making refer-
ence to relations with neighbouring points, c.f. Butterfield ([2006]).
2We do not wish, in making this claim, to make some sort of dogmatic commitment to
spacetime substantivalism. It may well be, for instance, that talk of spatial regions is in
principle eliminable in turn in favour of talk of the spatial relations between events, as in
Barbour’s version of field theory (Barbour, Foster, and O´ Murchadha [2002]).
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further to be grasped.
Now consider a converse example. In classical mechanics (of particles or
fields) it is possible to construct very elegant and abstract formulations in terms
of trajectories on a symplectic manifold. Such formulations are normally under-
stood as a mere mathematical convenience—a shorthand for the real field-based
or particle-based description—but how should we think about such a theory
(the theory, say, of 1023 point particles) if we were given it without being told
that it was intended in that way?
The theory would certainly look alien. It would present a single point evolv-
ing in an enormously high-dimensional (6×1023-dimensional) symplectic space.
The space should not be understood as featureless, though (or even featureless
other than the symplectic structure): the Hamiltonian that guides the point’s
evolution will be highly non-invariant under generic symplectomorphisms (trans-
formations only preserving symplectic structure), and so the symmetry group of
the theory will be very small compared to the symplectic group. On the usual
assumption (see, e. g. , Earman ([1989])) that a spacetime must have a struc-
ture rich enough to formulate its dynamics, but no more3—and so can have no
invariants or non-invariants under transformations that the dynamics do not
have—this means that the space (unlike, say, 6 × 1023-dimensional Euclidean
space) is highly non-isotropic and non-homogeneous.
Nonetheless, if we were to think of our theory as just about the evolution
of a single particle on that huge, exotically structured space, we would have
failed to understand its structure fully. True understanding comes from the
recognition that the theory is naturally isomorphic to—and so can be under-
stood as representing—the positions and velocities of 1023 particles in ordinary,
Euclidean, three-dimensional space. Only once we recognise that fact can we
get a clear grip on the theory’s structure, or relate it to our observed world of
spatially located objects.
Our claim, in essence, is that thinking about quantum mechanics in terms
of a wavefunction on configuration space is rather like thinking about classical
mechanics in terms of a point on phase space. In both cases, there is a far more
perspicuous way to understand the theory, one which is connected to spacetime
in a more direct way.
Before moving on, a caveat is in order. In trying to address the question of
how the world is according to quantum mechanics, we wish, so far as possible, to
remain neutral between a metaphysically substantive and a deflationary reading;
neutral, that is, between the (substantive) thought that we can successfully talk
about the one correct reading of the quantum state (description of how the
world is if QM is true) and the (deflationary) thought that perhaps the best we
can do is compare the merits of different more or less perspicuous descriptions
of something we can get no closer to (while remaining within the ambit of the
theory). Thus while we argue for the adoption of spacetime state realism over
wave-function realism, we wish to remain neutral on whether one of these (or
3The conclusion also follows from Brown’s thesis (Brown [2005]) that a spacetime’s struc-
ture is just a description of its dynamics.
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perhaps some third) really does provide the One True Interpretation of the
quantum state, or whether one is merely a more perspicuous description than
the other; a description of something that we are ultimately unable to render
unequivocally in intuitive terms.
Equally in classical physics, it seems clear to us that the more perspicuous
description of the theory is in terms of N particles in three-dimensional space,
not one particle in 6N -dimensional space, but we are neutral (here, at any rate!)
as to whether this means that the N -particle story is closer to the truth, or just
that the N -particle story is a more sensible way of describing the structure of
the world.
We do, however, want to stress that we regard the one-particle story as a co-
herent possibility (whether or not it is just the same possibility as the N -particle
story, differently described)—and that if the N -particle story were empirically
adequate (which it isn’t, of course) then so would the one-particle story be.
For that story (by construction) is isomorphic to the N -particle story, and the
emergence or otherwise of higher-level ontology from lower-level theories de-
pends, to our minds, primarily on the structure of those theories and not on
their underlying true nature (whatever that is). On the one-particle theory,
three-dimensional space would turn out to be emergent, but it would be no less
real for that: indeed, it would be emergent in such a strong and exact sense as
to make us inclined to regard the N -particle story as to be preferred.4
One might put things in these terms: in our view, there is no guide to the
ontology of a mathematically formulated theory beyond the mathematical struc-
ture of that theory (including that structure to do with observable quantities
and experiment). But when trying to learn ontological lessons from the theory,
one does well to prefer a representation which makes manifest the structure that
the theory ascribes to the world. One of the difficulties with the single particle,
high dimension story about classical mechanics is that it makes it less imme-
diately obvious what structure is being attributed to the world. The physical
world is very richly structured; a distribution of field amplitudes over 3-space,
or an arrangement of particles in 3-space is very obviously richly structured;
a single point in high dimensional space less obviously so. Despite the struc-
ture to that space implied by the Hamiltonian, one might conceivably miss the
isomorphism to N 3-space particles.
3 Wave-function realism
Let us now consider how we might go about understanding the quantum state.
A traditional view is that the state should be understood as somehow being a de-
scription or encoding of various classically describable or measurable properties.
According to this view, the potential properties of the system are represented
4We have found, in conversation, that there are some for whom it is just intuitively obvious
that the world isn’t like that. But personally speaking, we have no pre-theoretic intuitions at
all about what it would be like if the world were a highly non-isotropic 6× 1023-dimensional
space in which one particle moved, and we wouldn’t trust such intuitions if we did.
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by projectors on Hilbert space (although typically not all such projectors will
correspond conversely to bona fide classical properties), and the system deter-
minately possesses a property if (and only if) it is in the subspace projected
onto by the associated projector, and determinately does not possess a property
if (and only if) it is orthogonal to that subspace. As such, many properties seem
to be neither determinately possessed nor determinately not possessed.
This understanding is adequate for interpretations of quantum mechanics
in which the theory is simply an algorithm for predicting measurement out-
comes; it is adequate for interpretations which abandon classical logic. For
more traditionally realist interpretations—in particular for hidden-variable the-
ories like Bohm’s, dynamical-collapse theories like GRW’s, or for the Everett
interpretation—it is hopeless. Such theories read the quantum state literally, as
itself standing directly for a part of the ontology of the theory. To every different
quantum state corresponds a different concrete way the world is. For Everett
and for some readings of dynamical-collapse theories, the quantum state (per-
haps together with some background space or spacetime) gives the only part of
the ontology.
From this perspective, regarding the state as encoding properties of the
system in the traditional way is at best unhelpful and incomplete—many prop-
erties, like “being in an entangled state” or “being in some eigenstate of energy”
or “possessing an even number of zero amplitudes in configuration-space” can-
not be expressed using the traditional approach5. Focusing on projectors to
represent properties is too crude to capture all of the interesting properties of
the world when the quantum state directly describes ways the world is. At its
worst, the traditional approach can be actively misleading: for instance, it is
responsible for much of the confusion about the “problem of tails” in dynamical-
collapse theories and makes obscure the nature of the branches in the Everett
interpretation. (These claims are defended in extenso in Wallace ([2008])).
In that case, how should we think about the quantum state? Mathemati-
cally it is a vector (or, strictly, a ray) rotating in a very high-dimensional Hilbert
space. But this feels unsatisfactory: the physical universe is, as we have said,
very highly structured, whereas Hilbert-space vectors seem pretty much alike.
The problem is partially resolved when we recall that a quantum theory can only
be specified if we also give some particular set of ‘observables’ (e.g., the position
and momentum operators in one-particle QM, or the various field observables
in QFT)—this breaks the symmetry of Hilbert space, allowing us to see how
merely mathematically distinct vectors could represent physically distinct states
of affairs. (In a somewhat similar way, the complicated structure of a classical-
mechanical system is lost when that system is represented by a mere point on
phase space, until it is recognised that phase space is a highly structured, non-
homogeneous manifold.) The state vector can now be seen as a way of codifying
the various rich properties of the physical state: in one-particle quantum me-
5E.g., the disjunctive property of being in some energy eigenstate or other would, in pro-
jectors language, be given by a sum of projectors onto a complete set of energy eigenstates,
returning the projector onto the whole Hilbert space; thus every quantum state has this
property. Clearly something has gone wrong.
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chanics, for instance, to any self-adjoint function f(X̂, P̂ ) of the position and
momentum operators it assigns an ‘expectation value’ 〈ψ| f(X̂, P̂ ) |ψ〉. Differ-
ences between states can now be understood in terms of their differing patterns
of assignment of numbers to operators.
But how should such properties be understood? This is where perplexity
sets in. As argued above, anyone who takes the quantum state seriously should
avoid definitionally relating it to measurement: whatever “expectation value”
means, it had better not mean the mean result of measuring the observable.
Yet what other sense might we assign to it?
It is at this point that one may turn to the lessons illustrated in Section 2
for guidance. Can we follow the example that electromagnetism presented and
seek to grasp the meaning of the otherwise alien quantum state by relating it
to spatiotemporal properties?
At first blush it might seem not: the problem in quantum mechanics is that
the quantum state does not trivially have a suitable spacetime representation;
in particular, it is not representable as any ordinary sort of spacetime field. But
a natural move is available: wave-function realism, which has been explored re-
cently by (e.g.) Albert ([1996]), Monton ([2002], [2006]) and Lewis ([2004]). Al-
bert argues, following the lead of Bell ([1981]), that the quantum state, if under-
stood physically at all, should be understood in terms of its configuration-space
representation: that is, as a complex-valued field on 3N -dimensional space, for
an N -particle quantum theory. In this picture we have clear bearers and prop-
erties: the bearers are the points of a space at which certain properties—which
happen to be represented by a complex number (or vector, if we include inter-
nal degrees of freedom)—are instantiated. Understood this way, there seems
to be nothing more mysterious about the quantum state than about any other
complex-valued field—except that it lives not on spacetime, but on a far-larger
space—a space, furthermore, which (just as in the example of phase space con-
sidered in section 2) is highly non-homogeneous and non-isotropic, since its
dynamical symmetry group is far smaller than SO(3N). This seems a per-
fectly respectible and intelligible candidate for a quantum ontology. (Vaidman
([2002]) and Barbour ([1999]) describe their respective versions of the Everett
interpretation from the perspective of wave-function realism, though they do
not explore its implications.)
If wave-function realism is correct (and if it alone, and not some hidden
variables, is the physical basis for observed reality), the world is really 3N -
dimensional at its most fundamental level, and our 3-dimensional world is in
some sense emergent from it.
Wave-function realism has not been without its critics, however. Mon-
ton ([2002], [2006]), for example, raises the questions of whether the wave-
function realist ontology could underwrite requisite facts about three-dimensional
objects and their behaviour; and whether it provides a setting in which suitable
facts about mental goings-on could obtain.
The argument in (Monton [2002]) focuses on whether or not there is a unique
mapping from a) points in the 3N -dimensional space on which the field repre-
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sented by the wave-function lives, to b) configurations of N three-dimensional
objects. Now, of course we agree that purely mathematically any number of
such mappings can be constructed, but that is not of prime importance. Rather,
in our view, the central question is whether the structure of the field that the
wave-function represents could (both synchronically and diachronically) provide
a supervenience base for facts about the three-dimensional objects and spatial
relations among them of our experience; and it seems it can. Three-dimensional
features will emerge as a consequence of the dynamics (in large part due to
the process of decoherence): the form of the Hamiltonian will ensure that the
wave-function decomposes into components evolving autonomously according to
quasi-classical laws. That is, each of the decohering components will correspond
to a system of well-localised (in 3-space) wavepackets for macroscopic degrees
of freedom which will evolve according to approximately classical laws display-
ing the familiar three-dimensional symmetries, for all that they are played out
on a higher-dimensional space. Three-dimensional quasi-classical structures are
thereby recovered (just as in the case of classical mechanics which we men-
tioned in section 2) and mental events—should one be especially concerned
about them—will find their usual home.
Monton might be concerned that this structure of the field could underwrite
more than one set of emergent 3-spaces, but even if this were so (which seems
highly unlikely6) it would mean only that more than one set of emergent 3-
spaces existed at the same time, supervening on the wave-function ontology,
not that none did. (The pattern of thought here is the same as that applied
in decoherence-based solutions to the preferred-basis problem in Everett, cf.
Gell-Mann and Hartle ([1990]); Saunders ([1995]); Wallace ([2003]).)
In his 2006, Monton changes tack slightly, arguing that the main problem
with wave-function realism is its revisionary nature, rendering false reams of
everyday judgements concerning the nature of ordinary objects (e.g., that they
are three-dimensional); but again we demur. While the wave-function realist
will deny that three-dimensional objects and spatial structures find a place in
the fundamental ontology, this is not to say that the three dimensional objects
surrounding us, with which we constantly interact, and which we perceive, think
and talk about, do not exist; that there are not truths about them; it is just to
maintain that they are emergent objects, rather than fundamental ones. But
an emergent object is no less real for being emergent. It is also worth keeping
in mind that many workers in quantum gravity have long taken seriously the
possibility that our four-dimensional spacetime will turn out to be emergent
from some underlying reality that is either higher-dimensional (as in the case
of string theory7) or not spatiotemporal at all (as in the case of loop quantum
6Permuting the 1-dimensional variables in the expression of the wave-function into differ-
ent groupings of three, as Monton envisages, may well not give rise to structures that are
diachronically isomorphic to three-dimensional objects and relations. The ensuing structures
certainly wouldn’t obey the empirically correct quasi-classical laws.
7Popular accounts of string theory can sometimes give the impression that the emergence
of four-dimensional spacetime from an underlying 11-dimensional space is purely a matter
of coarse-graining, of ignoring sufficiently small distances; the actual physics is significantly
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gravity). In neither case is it suggested that ordinary spacetime is nonexistent,
just that it is emergent.
4 Problems with wave-function realism
But if wavefunction realism is a coherent metaphysical possibility, we feel it
nonetheless sits uneasily with real physics. One of our worries can be understood
even in the context of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics (NRQM): namely,
physicists normally regard all bases as on a par (so that the configuration-space
representation of the quantum state is just one representation among many);
they also regard various different formulations of the dynamics (Heisenberg,
Schro¨dinger, interaction-picture) as on a par. Both of these are violated by
wave-function realism, which gives the Schro¨dinger form of the dynamics, and
the position representation, a special status.8
To be fair, a case can be made in NRQM that both position-basis formu-
lations of the theory, and the Schro¨dinger picture, do indeed have a special
status; indeed, many students first learn NRQM in this form, and move on to
the Hilbert-space formalism only later. If NRQM were the only quantum theory
with which we were concerned, it would perhaps not be unreasonable to regard
the configuration-space formalism as primary, and the Hilbert-space alternative
just as a mathematical curiosity.
This brings us to quantum field theory (QFT), where things are not so
straightforward. In our view, two related worries about QFT make wave-
function realism an unattractive position at best, an unviable one at worst:
1. In quantum field theory, the particles are not fundamental and their po-
sitions are imprecisely defined; as such, no really satisfactory notion of
“configuration space” is available for us to formulate wave-function real-
ism.
2. Wave-function realism obscures the role of spacetime in the formulation
of quantum theory.
(A third problem, how wave-function realism deals with nonlocality and rela-
tivistic covariance, will be postponed until Section 6 and following).
more complex, however, and makes essential use of dynamical principles. (For instance, it has
been argued that the extra dimensions might have diameters up to several centimetres; and
we certainly don’t coarse-grain that much!) The correct criterion for whether a given higher-
dimensional theory is empirically adequate is, instead, whether it can be approximated at low
energies by an effective field theory which can be expressed on a four-dimensional background.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point.
8Is this just a sociological observation? Not in the relevant sense. Of course, we do not
want to claim that the philosophical commitments of physicists—even those demonstrated in
their practice as well as their own philosophising—are infallible (the measurement problem
is an obvious counter-example). But equally, we feel that philosophers of a naturalistic bent
should be cautious in arguing for the metaphysicial priority of any formulation of a physical
theory that is unnatural by physics’ own standards.
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To begin with the first problem: in QFT, particle number is not conserved.
If there is a “configuration-space” representation of the quantum state, it is
given by assigning a (non-normalised) wave-function to each of the infinitely
many 3N -dimensional configuration spaces. Wave-function realism now gives
us a picture, not of a single field undulating in a high-dimensional space, but of
an infinite number of such fields, each undulating in its own high-dimensional
space and each interacting with the others.
Is this picture problematic? It is certainly unintuitive; but so was wave-
function realism itself, and we have been at pains to stress that this is no criti-
cism of it. But things are actually rather worse than this, in fact. For particles
are not only non-conserved in QFT, they are non-fundamental: mathematically
speaking they are emergent entities supervenient on an underlying field ontol-
ogy. In fact, the properties of these entities (mass and charge, for instance) do
not take precisely-defined values, but must be chosen according to the particular
situation under consideration (see Wallace ([2006]) for a more detailed discus-
sion). This makes particle configurations unattractive—technically as well as
conceptually—as the basis for defining the ontology of QFT.
A superficially attractive alternative is to use a basis of field configurations:
in vacuum quantum electrodynamics, for instance, the wave-function would as-
sign a complex number to each possible state of the magnetic field. Such a
wave-function would be defined on an infinite-dimensional space9 but at least
we would only have one such wave-function.
The problem with this move is that there is no single preferred choice of
fields by which a QFT can be specified. A number of results from QFT (from
formal results like Borchers equivalence (Haag [1996]) to concrete models like
the Sine-Gordon equation (Coleman [1985], pp. 246–252)) suggest that a single
QFT can be equivalently described in terms of several different choices of field
observable, with nothing in particular to choose between them.
We might sum up the objection thus: wave-function realism requires a meta-
physically preferred basis. In NRQM, there is a single natural choice of such
basis: the configuration-space basis is conceptually natural and dynamically
special. There is no such natural choice in QFT: many different bases are dy-
namically on a par and the “natural” choice is situation-dependent. This makes
any particular metaphysical preference appear somewhat ad hoc.
(This objection is probably most significant for Everettians, who generally
regard it as a virtue of their preferred interpretation that it requires no addi-
tional formalism, and so are unlikely to look kindly on a requirement in the
metaphysics for additional formalism. Advocates of dynamical-collapse and
hidden-variable theories are already committed to adding additional formalism,
and in fact run into problems in QFT for rather similar reasons: there is no
longer a natural choice of basis to use in defining the collapse mechanism or
the hidden variables. We are not ourselves sanguine about the prospects of
9We ignore details of renormalisation; if we regard the high-energy cutoff as real (as ad-
vocated by Wallace [2006]) and if the universe is spatially closed then the dimension of the
space will be finite but extremely large.
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overcoming this problem10; but if it were to be overcome, the solution might
well also suggest a metaphysically preferred basis to use in formulating a QFT
version of wave-function realism.)
What of the second objection? We stress that we have no conceptual objec-
tion to a view of spacetime on which it is emergent from some more fundamental
theory; rather, we do not find this a good account of spacetime in physics as we
find it. Whilst it is true that spacetime in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics
is somewhat elusive, it is mathematically fundamental in QFT: the dynamical
variables in QFT are explicitly associated with spacetime regions.
At least heuristically, these dynamical variables can be thought of as being
built up from integrals over products of field operators located at a point, such
as
Ô =
∫
∆
dx φ̂(x)φ̂(x) (1)
where ∆ is some spacetime region. (The point of Borchers equivalence is that
Ô could be expressed in terms of different field operators whilst still being
associated with the same region ∆.)
The objection is sharper still in the case of semiclassical quantum gravity
(see, for instance, Wald [1994]). Here we define the quantum fields on a curved
spacetime background and require that background to satisfy the classical Ein-
stein field equations with respect to the expected distribution of stress-energy.
Such models are used to address issues like black hole evaporation and early-
universe cosmology; there are sound theoretical reasons to regard them as an
appropriate limiting case to full quantum gravity in some regimes, though there
is very little direct empirical evidence for their accuracy. It is opaque to us
how semiclassical quantum gravity can be understood except via a quantum
ontology which treats spacetime as fundamental.
If wave-function realism were “the only game in town”, these objections
would have to be overcome somehow; by biting various bullets, perhaps they
can be. But in fact an alternative ontology is available, one which respects
the democracy of Hilbert-space bases and which gives a more central role to
spacetime. This alternative, we believe, bears much the same relation to wave-
function realism as the N -particles-in-space view of classical mechanics bears to
the one-particle-in-phase-space view. We present it in the next section.
5 Spacetime state realism
Wave-function realism presented a clear ontology by preferring a particular set
of operators and finding a spatial arena by enlarging the fundamental physical
space from three dimensions to 3N dimensions; thereby providing sufficient
property bearers. If we do not wish to prefer a basis, then we should stick to
the characterisation of the quantum state of a system as a (positive, normalised)
linear functional of the dynamical variables; that is, mathematically, as a density
10Extant proposals for Bohmian QFTs, in particular, seem to us to pay insufficient attention
to the problem of renormalisation, though a full discussion lies beyond the scope of this article.
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operator on the Hilbert space of the system. To go from this to a candidate
ontology, though, we still require both clear bearers of properties and a clear
view of the structure that a quantum state would ascribe to the world. We
propose that what is crucial is an analysis of the total system—the Universe—
into subsystems.
Suppose one were to assume that the Universe could naturally be divided
into subsystems; assign to each subsystem a density operator11. We then have
a large number of bearers of properties—the subsystems—and the density op-
erator assigned to each represents the intrinsic properties that each subsystem
instantiates, just as the field value assigned to each spacetime point in elec-
tromagnetism, or the complex number assigned to each point in wave-function
realism, represented intrinsic properties. While the property that having a given
density operator represents may not be a familiar one, the case need be no dif-
ferent in principle from that of electromagnetism. In so far as one can continue
to press for the physical meaning of the density operator, the theory in which
these objects are postulated must provide the answer. (We can say such things,
for example, as: the property is not a scalar one, in contrast to wave-function
realism. We sketch how the relation to the macroscopic goings-on of our expe-
rience would be developed in Section 9.) To provide a simple model, imagine a
Universe consisting of a great many interacting qubits (cf. Deutsch and Hay-
den ([2000]) or von Weizsacker’s ur -alternatives (von Weizsacker [2006])). The
qubits each bear the property or properties represented by their two dimen-
sional density operator; pairings of qubits bear properties represented by a four
dimensional operator; and so on. There need be no reason to blanche at an
ontology merely because the basic properties are represented by such objects:
we know of no rule of segregation which states that only those mathematical
items to which one is introduced sufficiently early on in the schoolroom get to
count as possible representatives of physical quantities, for example!
Note that if, by contrast, we were to treat the Universe just as one big system,
with no subsystem decomposition, then we would only have a single property
bearer (the Universe as a whole) instantiating a single property (represented
by the Universal density operator) and we would lack sufficient articulation to
make clear physical meaning of what was presented (as with the one-particle-
in-high-dimensional-space view of classical mechanics, one would struggle to see
the structure being imputed to the world in this case).
Now, our proposal becomes more concrete when one connects this system-
subsystem analysis of the quantum state with spacetime. To do this we need
some notion of the spatial location of a physical system. In NRQM this is
somewhat complicated: the systems are naturally taken to be particles and
assemblies of particles, and a particle’s spatial location is one of its dynamical
properties, not something to be specified ab initio.
It is somewhat simpler if we consider the Fock-space formalism of NRQM,
where we allow the number of particles to vary.12 On the one-particle Hilbert
11We intend that if A and B are both subsystems of the Universe then A ∪ B is too. On
the significance of this, see Section 6.
12Recall that if H is any Hilbert space, the associated symmetric (bosonic) and antisym-
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space of any non-relativistic particle we can define projectors P̂∆ projecting
onto those states with wave-functions having support in spatial region ∆. If
{∆i} is a partition of real space into measurable subsets and if Hi = P̂∆iH
is the Hilbert space built from all states having support in ∆i, then we have
H = ⊕iHi and moreover
F(H) = F(⊕iHi) = ⊗iF(Hi), (2)
so the Hilbert spaces F(Hi) may be taken as representing the possible states
of the subsystem in, or comprising, region ∆i.
13 This means that we can take
the regions of space (and their unions) as our basic bearers of properties: tensor
products of states belonging to each region (in general, superpositions of such
products) allow us to express the original total state of varying particle number.
Already our presentation is sounding somewhat field-theoretic. To illustrate
what is going on, consider a particular region of space ∆j . This region has
a Fock space F(Hj) whose (pure) basis states can be represented in the form
|n1, n2, . . .〉, where n1, n2 etc. represent the occupation numbers of what we can
think of as the available modes of ∆j , that is, the number of excitations in each
of some orthogonal set of states of Hj . What we would normally think of in
NRQM as a single particle localised in ∆j will, in this setting, be represented by
a singly excited state of F(Hj), e.g. |1, 0, 0 . . .〉, tensor product with the vacuum
state |0〉 for all the other regions’ Fock spaces. In general, then, a single particle
(which usually won’t be localised in some particular region) will be represented
by an entangled state composed of a superposition of states each differing from
the vacuum only in a small region ∆i:
. . . |1, 0, . . .〉|0〉|0〉 . . .+ . . . |0〉|1, 0 . . .〉|0〉 . . .+ . . . |0〉|0〉|1, 0, . . .〉 . . .
and so on.
Things become simpler still when we move to full quantum field theory. In
the algebraic formulation of QFT, we associate to each spacetime region R a
C∗-algebra A(R) of operators, representing the dynamical variables associated
metric (fermionic) Fock spaces are
FS(H) = ⊕
∞
i=0S(⊗
iH)
and
FA(H) = ⊕
∞
i=0A(⊗
iH)
where S andA are symmetrisation and antisymmetrisation operators. The distinction between
FS(H) and FA(H) plays no part in the argument, and will be ignored in the text.
13Intuitive support for the result expressed in eqn. 2 can be seen once we recognise that
the Fock-space operation is a sort of ‘exponential’ of the Hilbert space (this is clearest from
the power-series expansion of the exponential), so that we can write F(H) = exp(H). Then
equation 2 becomes exp(⊕iHi) = ⊗i exp(Hi). More formally, for each i let â
†
i,k
be a set of
creation operators for states in Hi. Then it is easy to see (via the observation that creation
operators on different Hilbert spaces commute) that states of form
â
†
i1,k1
· · · â†
in,kn
|Ω〉
(where |Ω〉 is the vacuum) form a basis both for ⊗iF(Hi) and for F(⊕iHi).
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to region R. A state ρ of such a region is a positive linear functional on A(R)
(often described in rather instrumentalist terms as giving the expectation value
of each element ofA(R)) and by the Gelfand-Naimark-Segal construction we can
associate ρ with a state in a Hilbert spaceHR, and representA(R) as an algebra
of operators on HR (see, e. g. , Haag ([1996], pp.122-124) for the details). HR
can then be taken as the Hilbert space of the field in regionR.14 If preferred, one
can even remain at the more abstract level, forego the representation theorems
and just take the C∗-algebraic state itself as denoting the properties of a region.
This alternative ontology avoids the problems previously identified for wave-
function realism: it is well-defined for any quantum theory with compositional
structure (in particular, for any quantum field theory, and for any many-particle
theory once it is expressed in field-theoretic terms); it respects the dynamical
structure of QM, indicating no preference for Schro¨dinger over Heisenberg or
interaction dynamics (as the state is just construed as a linear functional of
the dynamical variables); it adds no additional interpretational structure (given
that the compositional structure of the system is, ex hypothesi, already contained
within the formalism); and it gives an appropriately central role to spacetime.
For want of a better name, we call it spacetime state realism.15
6 Locality
How is one to visualise the quantum state, according to our proposal? Recall
the discussion of Section 2: typically in classical physics we understand physical
systems via the properties they ascribe to spacetime regions. Wave-function
realism keeps this basic framework at the cost of greatly enlarging the back-
ground spacetime: the quantum state is a complex field much like the classical
Klein-Gordon field, but it is defined on an extremely high-dimensional space.
Our proposal is in one sense closer to the classical situation: we associate a set
of properties (represented by a density operator) to each region of spacetime. In
another sense, though, it is less classical than wave-function realism: it displays
a certain sort of nonlocality.
To see this, let A and B be spacelike separated regions. The universal quan-
tum state, like a classical field, associates a state to A, B, and A ∪ B. But
there is an important disanalogy. Classically, the separate states of A and B
completely determine the state of A∪B—once the electromagnetic field, say, is
known in A and B, it is known also in A∪B. Healey ([1991]) calls this property
separability: the principle that the properties of a spacetime region supervene
on the properties of its spatiotemporal parts (see also (Earman [1987]) for a
14In the standard presentations of AQFT, the algebra A(R) is infinite-dimensional; as such
it has multiple non-isomorphic representations, and so different states lead to different Hilbert
spaces. This makes it less clear that we are licensed to talk about HR as “the” Hilbert space
for region R. One of us has argued elsewhere, however (Wallace [2006]) that this is an artefact
of the formalism, which disappears when we properly understand the renormalisation process;
as such, we ignore this complication in the text.
15Although if the theory has a compositional structure not induced by spacetime regions—as
in, say, an abstractly specified quantum computer—this name is a misnomer.
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discussion of various senses of locality). We might equally call it Humean super-
venience, after Lewis’s thesis—which he attributes to Hume—that all properties
of the world supervene on properties of spacetime points and on the relations
between those points (Lewis [1986], pp.ix–xvii).
Thanks to the phenomenon of entanglement, separability is simply false for
the quantum state according to spacetime state realism: if the state ρ̂A∪B is
known, then via the partial trace operation we can learn the states of A and B,
but of course the converse is not so.
We should not be surprised, perhaps: quantum mechanics is nonlocal; every-
one knows that, don’t they? But notice that the description given of nonlocality
is very different according to wave-function realism. There, the state on config-
uration space is completely separable: specify a complex number at each point
and you specify the state. According to wave-function realism, non-separability
on three-dimensional space is an illusion, or better, an emergent property—it
is a consequence of our attempt to use three-dimensional language to describe
an entity which fundamentally lives in 3N -dimensional space. By contrast, in
spacetime state realism non-separability is fundamental.
Is this a reason in favour of wave-function realism (setting aside our previous
arguments against its tenabity)? Not in our opinion, for three reasons:
1. As nonlocal forms of behaviour go, non-separability is fairly mild. It does
not imply any sort of action at a distance: the quantum state of spacetime
regionA is dynamically determined by the state of its past light cone (more
precisely: by the state of any spacelike slice of its past light cone). The
state of A ∪ B may indeed be changed by operations in the vicinity of
either A or B, but the state of B is unaffected by operations performed
at A. (Note also that it is milder than the nonlocality predicted by the
Bell inequalities: those concern changes made to the local state at A as
a consequence of operations performed at B. Since we are considering
only unitary quantum mechanics—and so, by implication, presuming the
Everett interpretation—some of the premises of Bell’s theorem aren’t in
play. (See e.g. Timpson and Brown ([2002]) for a discussion of Bell’s
theorem and locality in Everett.))
We are, in fact, unmoved by purely metaphysical objections to action at
a distance. Our concern about it stems from its tension with relativistic
covariance. But there is no such tension in the case of non-separability.
2. It is tempting to regard separability as part of our ordinary conception of
space: arguably, if some putative spacetime has essentially nonlocal prop-
erties, or perhaps better, if the things in it (e.g., fields) have to end up
being attributed non-separable properties, we ought not to call the arena
“spacetime”.16 But there is nothing mathematically improper about these
16Essentially this idea may be found in Einstein: “It is...characteristic of...physical objects
that they are thought of as arranged in a space-time continuum. An essential aspect of this
arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence
independent of one another, provided these objects ‘are situated in different parts of space’.
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nonlocal properties. And even according to wave-function realism, the
four-dimensional spacetime we live in (an emergent object, supervenient
on the wave-function) itself involves non-separability in exactly the way
described by spacetime state realism. The two ontologies are not in dis-
agreement about whether ordinary spacetime allows separability; they are
in disagreement about whether this spacetime is fundamental. And if our
paradigm example of a space involves non-separability, we see no plausible
argument that our conception of space requires separability. Rather, we
have a mere intuition that it does—an intuition developed because space
looks separable, unless you look very carefully.
3. In any case, there are respectable classical examples of non-separability. In
particular, the Aharonov-Bohm effect is best understood as implying that
electromagnetism is non-separable: specifying the connection on regions
A and B does not suffice to determine it on A∪B unless the latter region
is simply connected. If non-separability is reasonable for the A-B effect,
why not for the quantum state?17
(Of course, the implications of the A-B effect are not uncontroversial;
one might as easily argue that non-separability is unreasonable in both
cases. We expand on our preferred reading of the A-B effect, and on the
analogies between that effect and quantum non-locality, in Wallace and
Timpson ([2009])).
In fact, once we consider the relativistic domain there are active advantages
to spacetime state realism’s treatment of nonlocality, as we will see in Section 8.
First, however, it will be useful to consider how the spacetime state ontology
fares in the case of non-unitary dynamics.
7 Non-unitary dynamics on the spacetime on-
tology
So far we have been considering quantum states evolving under purely unitary
dynamics. There are, however, some reasons to be interested in adding non-
unitary processes to the dynamics—specifically, if we are unhappy with the
Everett interpretation and with hidden-variable theories, we may wish to regard
wave-function collapse as a real microphysical process and to model it non-
unitarily.
Unless one makes this kind of assumption about the independence of the existence (the ‘being
thus’) of objects which are far apart from one another in space...physical thinking in the
familiar sense would not be possible.” (Einstein [1948])
17Why do we call the A-B effect classical? Because mathematically it is a classical conse-
quence of the interactions between a U(1) connection and a complex field. Inconveniently, the
complex fields we see around us (the proton and electron fields) have no accessible classical
limit, so we observe its effect on the quanta of those fields, but the effect is not essentially
quantum-mechanical. See Wallace ([2009]) for more on this point.
16
It is reasonable to assume that wave-function collapse must be implemented
by a non-Lorentz-covariant dynamics, for familiar reasons: if one prepares two
particles in an entangled state, separates them widely, and measures one of
them, the other is supposed to collapse immediately—and “immediately” seems
to imply a preferred frame. But there is an alternative tradition (defended at
various times by, e. g. , Aharonov and Albert ([1980]), Fleming ([1988]), Myr-
vold ([2002], [2003]), and Tumulka ([2006])): foliation-relative collapse (FRC).
According to FRC, a collapse event should be modelled as occurring not at a
point but on a hypersurface.
It is difficult to make a really thorough evaluation of the merits of FRC,
since it remains a framework only: there is at present no satisfactorily worked-
through relativistic collapse theory, let alone one which reproduces the predic-
tions of QFT. Yet two things seem clear. Firstly, FRC does seem to offer, in
principle, a framework for a covariant quantum theory which nonetheless incor-
porates dynamical collapse. Secondly, it has some extremely counter-intuitive
consequences.
To illustrate this latter point, suppose that we prepare two widely-separated
particles in an entangled state (see Figure 1), so that on surface Λ1 the combined
state is
|ψ1〉 = α |0〉 |1〉+ β |1〉 |0〉 ; (3)
and we go on to measure the spins of both of them (with the measurement on
particle i occurring at point Xi).
If we analyse the situation using a foliation containing Λ1, Λ2 and Λ4—that
is, on a foliation in which particle 1 is measured first and particle 2 second—the
history of the system will be something like: first there is a stochastic process
(between Λ1 and Λ2) caused by the measurement of particle 1, in which particle
1 collapses into (say) |0〉 and particle 2 into |1〉; then there is a deterministic
process (between Λ2 and Λ4) where we passively determine that the state of
particle 2 is indeed in state |1〉. However, the history looks very different on a
foliation containing Λ1, Λ3 and Λ4, so that 2 is measured before 1. According to
this second foliation, the stochastic process (between Λ1 and Λ3) is triggered by
the measurement of particle 2, and it is the measurement of particle 1 (between
Λ3 and Λ4) that is the passive observation.
Note, however, that the observed consequences of the two measurements are
the same (particle 1 has spin up; particle 2 has spin down), and that the end
state on Λ4 is the same in both foliations,
|ψ4〉 = |0〉 |1〉 . (4)
This makes it a somewhat subtle business to say just what, if anything, is
unacceptable about FRC. Indeed, some have argued that in fact there is nothing
wrong with it, and that its consequences—though indeed counter-intuitive—
are inevitable given relativity and non-locality, and should not be regarded as
unacceptable. (See Myrvold ([2002], [2003]) and references therein.)
We are unpersuaded, but we do not want to defend this here. Our goal in
this paper is more modest: to use the spacetime state framework to clarify the
17
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Figure 1: A spacetime diagram of the histories of two particles; time runs vertically.
Λ0 to Λ4 label distinct hypersurfaces of simultaneity. Particles 1 and 2 are spacelike
separated and begin (on Λ0) in an entangled state. Regions Rj , Sj , Tj lie on the
worldline of particle j (1 or 2). At X1, particle 1 is measured; at X2, particle 2 is
measured. The story one tells about the effects of these measurements is very different
depending on whether one uses a foliation in which X1 precedes X2 ({Λ0,Λ1,Λ2,Λ4})
or in which X2 precedes X1 ({Λ0,Λ1,Λ3,Λ4}). Note that in the spacetime state
framework, we may replace talk of states of particles relative to elements of a foliation
with direct talk of the states of spacetime regions, such as Rj , Sj and Tj .
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sense in which non-unitary dynamics has consequences going beyond those of
unitary dynamics. To this end we shall now allow ourselves to talk directly of
the states of the pertinent spacetime regions shown in Figure 1; considering first
the unitary case, before seeing how things differ under non-unitary dynamics.
Thus suppose that in Figure 1 the transformations performed at X1 and X2
were unitary—say,
|0〉 −→ |1〉
|1〉 −→ − |0〉 ; (5)
a spin-flip rather than a measurement. The states of the various relevant regions
are easily calculated:
ρ̂R1 = ρ̂S1 = |α|2 |0〉 〈0|+ |β|2 |1〉 〈1|
ρ̂R2 = ρ̂S2 = |β|2 |0〉 〈0|+ |α|2 |1〉 〈1|
ρ̂T1 = |β|2 |0〉 〈0|+ |α|2 |1〉 〈1|
ρ̂T2 = |α|2 |0〉 〈0|+ |β|2 |1〉 〈1|
and ρ̂Λi = |ψi〉 〈ψi| where
|ψ1〉 = α |0〉 |1〉+ β |1〉 |0〉
|ψ2〉 = α |1〉 |1〉 − β |0〉 |0〉
|ψ3〉 = −α |0〉 |0〉+ β |1〉 |1〉
|ψ4〉 = −α |1〉 |0〉 − β |0〉 |1〉 .
We observe that, as expected, the state on both Λ2 and Λ3 is changed from
Λ1, since either X1 or X2 lies in the past light cone of each region. The states
of the individual particles, however, are unambiguously fixed by the dynamics,
and neither particle’s individual state is affected by a transformation outside its
light cone — X1 lies outside the past light cone of S2, for instance, so ρ̂S2 = ρ̂R2
even though S2 is part of Λ2 and the state of Λ2 is changed by X1.
Things are otherwise in the event of collapse, where we make a measurement
rather than a spin flip at Xi. The (hypothetical) stochastic dynamics produce
perfectly reasonable (non-deterministic) predictions for all the joint states—
assigning a non-zero probability to, say, ρ̂Λi = |φi〉 〈φi| where
|φ1〉 = α |0〉 |1〉+ β |1〉 |0〉
|φ2〉 = |φ3〉 = |φ4〉 = |0〉 |1〉 .
But there is no unique prescription for the one-particle states. Take S2, for
instance—if it is regarded as part of Λ1 then it has state
|β|2 |0〉 〈0|+ |α|2 |1〉 〈1| ; (6)
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if it is regarded as part of Λ2 then it has state |1〉 〈1|. We might interpret this
(at the risk of confusion with a terminology adopted elsewhere in philosophy of
QM) as a contextuality of local states—the state of a region depends on which
larger region it is regarded as a part of. We might also interpret it as denying
the existence of states for many regions of spacetime—regions only have states
at all if they are assigned the same state by all foliations. We might call this
nihilism about local states, a name which will be particularly apt if, as we are
inclined to suspect (but have not proved), in realistic models virtually no regions
smaller than entire foliations are assigned states.
To conclude this section: there is an “hierarchy of counterintuitiveness” here.
We have
1. Full locality (classical physics). All spacetime regions have states; the state
of a region supervenes on the states of its subregions.
2. Non-separability (unitary quantum physics). All spacetime regions have
states but the state of a region does not supervene on the states of its
subregions.
3a. Contextuality (non-unitary quantummechanics, first interpretation). Space-
time regions smaller than entire hypersurfaces have states which are de-
pendent on which larger region they are regarded as part of.
3b. Nihilism (non-unitary quantum mechanics, second interpretation). Some
or all spacetime regions smaller than entire hypersurfaces have no states
at all.
8 Relativity and Poincare´ covariance
Relativistic covariance is straightforward to understand according to spacetime
state realism: if A is a spacetime region and L is a Poincare´ transformation
(represented on Hilbert space by some operator ÛL) then the state of region A
after performing L as a global active transformation is determined by the state
of L−1A before the transformation. This is easy to see: the state of A is just
given by the expectation value of all operators localised in A. So after the active
transformation, to specify the state we need terms like
〈ψ| Û †LΦ̂(x)Φ̂(y)ÛL |ψ〉 (7)
where x and y are points in A. But if Φ̂ is a scalar field, by the construction of
a QFT we have
Û
†
LΦ̂(x)ÛL = Φ̂(L−1x), (8)
and so
〈ψ| Û †LΦ̂(x)Φ̂(y)ÛL |ψ〉 = 〈ψ| Φ̂(L−1x)Φ̂(L−1y) |ψ〉 ; (9)
considering vector or spinor fields adds only technical complexity.
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The situation is rather different for wave-function realism. There is a sense
in which the theory is Poincare´-covariant—namely, that there is a representation
of the Poincare´ group as unitary operators on the space of wave-functions on
the configuration space18 such that a sequence of wave-functions Ψ(t) satisfy
the Schro¨dinger equation only if the sequence ÛLΨ(t) does for all L. (Put
another way: the Schro¨dinger equation is form-invariant under the action of
this representation of the Poincare´ group.) But since the wave-function is a
function on a space of dimension far higher than three, it is somewhat opaque
what the connections are between this result and the usual interpretation of the
Poincare´ group in terms of the symmetries of Minkowski spacetime19.
The problem may be sharpened via a remarkable observation due to David
Albert (Albert [2007]). If wave-function realism is correct, then we might nat-
urally expect that the entire history of the universe should be given by the
sequence Ψ(t) for all t. As in the classical case, an alternative sequence like
ÛLΨ(t) should be a mere redescription of the first sequence. But in fact, this is
not the case, as can be shown by a simple example. Consider again the situation
of Figure 1: two distinguishable spin-half particles 1 and 2 are prepared in a
singlet state20
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉 − |1〉 |0〉). (10)
We now consider:
Scenario A: The spin degrees of freedom of the particles remain unaltered for
all time.
Scenario B: At X1 and X2 we perform a spin flip operation on 1 and 2 re-
spectively:
|0〉 −→ |1〉
|1〉 −→ − |0〉 . (11)
If we describe the evolution of the state in a foliation where X1 and X2 are
simultaneous (one containing Λ0, Λ1, Λ4, say), then scenarios A and B have the
same effect on the quantum state: nothing. That is, the state remains a singlet
at all times.
This is not the case in other foliations. Consider a foliation where X1 pre-
cedes X2 (i.e., we include Λ2 of Figure 1). In scenario A, of course, the state
18Those readers who recall our criticisms of wave-function realism in Section 4 may rea-
sonably ask: which configuration space? Two natural answers are available: if we consider
a fixed number of particles which do not interact, we can use ‘ordinary’ N-particle quantum
mechanics; more generally we can use a field configuration space.
19A similar concern is raised by Lewis ([2004]), who queries the apparent mismatch between
the symmetry of the Hamiltonian and the structure of the space on which the wavefunction
is defined in NRQM.
20This is a simplified version of Albert’s own example, which involves four particles. Albert’s
example, however, has the advantage of being manifestly covariant, demonstrating that the
non-covariance of Scenario B is not important.
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remains unchanged at all times. But in scenario B, there is a period during
which 1 but not 2 has undergone the spin flip, leading to a global state
∣∣φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|1〉 |1〉+ |0〉 |0〉). (12)
It follows from this that the sequence |Ψ(t)〉 does not actually fix the Lorentz-
transformed sequence: two worlds may be described by the same sequence but
have different Hamiltonians, and so will have different descriptions following a
Lorentz transformation. Two observations immediately follow:
1. For a Poincare´-covariant quantum theory, the sequence of states ÛL |Ψ(t)〉
cannot be interpreted as a mere redescription of the sequence |Ψ(t)〉.
2. For a Poincare´-covariant quantum theory, the sequence of states |Ψ(t)〉
cannot be regarded as completely specifying the properties of the system.
Albert calls a theory narratable if specifying a system’s state at all times is
sufficient to specify all properties of a system. Poincare´-covariant quantum
mechanics is not narratable: if we give the state at all times on a given foliation,
we have given something less than the complete description of the system.21
One of the common arguments used in favour of the Everett interpretation
over other interpretations is that it is fully compatible with special relativity.
The conclusion Albert draws from narratability failure is that this presumed
advantage is overstated. On the one hand, as we have seen in Section 7, there
are Lorentz-covariant frameworks for dynamical-collapse theories—they have
counter-intuitive consequences, but Albert interprets these as special cases of
the failure of narratability. If he is correct, then if narratability failure is also
acceptable in the Everett interpretation, why not in dynamical-collapse theories?
On the other hand, if narratability failure is not acceptable, the only alter-
native is to give up on Lorentz covariance as fundamental and accept a preferred
(albeit undetectable) foliation. But if this is acceptable in the Everett interpre-
tation, why not in other interpretations (notably, hidden-variable theories like
the Bohm theory, or non-covariant collapse theories)?
We reject the first horn of Albert’s dilemma. As we have tried to show
in Section 7, the consequences of covariant non-unitary dynamics are relevantly
worse than those of covariant unitary dynamics. But we wish to draw a different
conclusion from Albert’s argument: namely, that it provides a further argument
for spacetime state realism over wave-function realism.
To elaborate: according to wave-function realism the world is fundamentally
local, but the dimensionality of space is very large (3N -dimensional)—the state
of the universe at an instant is represented by a complex function on that space.
Then it is hard to see how to think about the entire history of the universe other
21The phenomenon of narratability failure in Poincare´-covariant quantum theories relates to
the fact that, unlike in the Galilean case, the operators generating the Lorentz-boosts depend
on the Hamiltonian of the system; see for example (Fleming [2002]). We thank Jeremy
Butterfield for the observation and Wayne Myrvold for the reference.
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than as a complex function on a 3N + 1-dimensional spacetime. And that is
what narratability failure rules out.
On the other hand, spacetime state realism is fundamentally non-local (non-
separable, to be more exact). However, suppose that we have any spacetime
theory which is (a) non-separable, so that there can be simultaneous spacetime
regions A and B such that the state of A ∪ B is not determined by the states
of A and B separately, and (b) is also covariant. Covariance entails that there
can also be non-simultaneous spacetime regions whose joint state is not fixed
by their separate states. This opens up the possibility of failure of narratability:
specification of global states on elements of one foliation on their own will not in
general fix the joint states of non-simultaneous regions (regions which do not lie
on some single hypersurface in the foliation), hence will not fix the global states
on another foliation (as the latter foliation will involve linking up hypersurfaces
which are non-simultaneous, according to the first).22
From this perspective, we can explain any initial surprise at narratability
failure as due to our failure to take non-separability sufficiently seriously. In the
Good Old Days of classical physics, we thought that to specify the state of a
spacetime region it sufficed to specify the state of all arbitrarily small subregions
of that region. When confronted with nonseparability, we accepted that this was
insufficient, but assumed without justification that it would suffice to specify
the state of all elements in an arbitrary foliation of the region. In fact, in a
nonseparable theory there are no shortcuts. In principle at least, the state of
any region must be specified directly: no attempt to specify it in terms of any
non-trivial decomposition into subregions will work.
This is not to downplay the importance of foliations, of course. For a va-
riety of reasons23 we are often only interested in local properties—properties
of spacetime points, in the limit. And all of these properties are indeed fully
specified by the quantum state on each element of a foliation. Furthermore,
they are dynamically determined—indeed, all properties, however nonlocal, are
dynamically determined—by the quantum state on a single element of this or
any other foliation, once the Hamiltonian is taken as fixed. But this dynam-
ical observation should not be confused with the entirely different—and quite
false—claim that Poincare´-covariant QM is narratable.
9 Finding the appearances
A final point should be addressed briefly before concluding. We noted amongst
the prolegomena that when presenting an ontology, one hopes to be able to
22It is an interesting question exactly to what extent narratability failure is generic in non-
separable relativistic theories, quantum or otherwise. Note that if one were able to infer
the dynamics by perusing the sequence of states on a given foliation then this would allow
one to calculate the state on any hypersurface from a previous one. So examples illustrating
narratability failure will need to exploit the presence of symmetries precluding such inference.
We thank Wayne Myrvold and Tim Maudlin for discussion of this point.
23Perhaps best understood in terms of the structure of the decoherence-defined branching
in the Everett interpretation, which is in turn determined by the local nature of the dynamics.
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recount, even if only sketchily, how the property bearers and the properties one
postulates in the ontology relate to appearances. How might such a story go in
the case of spacetime state realism?
The general story will be the same as that in any approach which takes
unitary quantum mechanics to be a complete theory: decoherence will pro-
vide an emergent classicality; more precisely, a superposition of effectively au-
tonomous quasi-classical sequences of events. Observers able to monitor and
interact with their surroundings emerge as inhabitants within such independent
quasi-classical histories; corresponding to particular complex arrangements of
fundamental particles; evolved to take advantage of the existence of enduring
records that decoherence allows (Gell-Mann and Hartle [1990]; Saunders [1993]).
The only addition to this general picture in our proposal is that the states
of spacetime regions are the primary elements. Determinate quasi-classical go-
ings on will correspond to certain special states of large regions (which will
themselves correspond (in general) to highly entangled states of the component
sub-regions). In the absence of dynamical collapse, though, the states of large
regions will typically correspond to no (single) quasi-classical situation. Rather,
decoherence will guarantee that the states of these regions are convex sums of
the special “quasi-classical” states:
ρ̂A =
∑
i
piρ̂
i
A (13)
where each ρ̂iA is a quasi-classical state of A. Each quasi-classical component
evolves independently of the others, so ρ̂A encodes not one, but a great many
simultaneously present quasi-classical situations. And the spatial extension of
the quasi-classical goings-on is encoded in the entanglement between states: if
B is some largish region adjacent to A, then the state of A ∪B might be
ρ̂A∪B =
∑
i
piρ̂
i
A ⊗ ρ̂iB; (14)
the local states of A and B each encode many simultaneously present quasi-
classical situations, and the nonlocal information in ρ̂A∪B encodes the connec-
tions between them that justifies the “many-worlds” language customarily used
to describe the Everett interpretation24. This brings home the point that the
true state of a spatial region is very far from being directly accessible to any
realistic agent. An observer in region A (present in the quasi-classical situation
encoded by ρ̂iA, say) might very well speak of the state of A being ρ̂
i
A and the
state of B as being ρ̂iB, but these would be emergent and approximate notions
(somewhat akin to Everett’s original ‘relative states’). The true, ontologically
primary, state of A would still be ρ̂A.
24The state given by (14) is actually what would be termed a ‘classically correlated’ or
separable state of A ∪ B, but this shouldn’t mislead one into thinking that the regions are
unentangled. Whether or not reduced states of subsytems of a N-party entangled state are
themselves entangled depends on the type of N-party entanglement that obtains. If the global
state is pure, then a state like (14) for subregions can only arise because of the existence of
entanglement.
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To help relate this rather abstract account to the more familiar, if somewhat
specialised, examples one is used-to from quantum mechanical measurement
theory, we can consider how an idealised measurement situation might look.
In general, such cases of measurement would involve the establishment of en-
tanglement between the regions where the object system may be thought of as
located and the regions corresponding to the possible positions of macroscopic
pointer variables. (The positions of pointers, and later, the states of observers,
would constitute parts of the quasi-classical situations described by certain of
the quasi-classical states, in the terminology of the preceding paragraph.) To
take a very simple example in illustration, consider the Coleman-Hepp model
of a spin measurement (Hepp [1972]), discussed by Bell (Bell [1975]).
The model consists of a single moving spin-1/2 system which interacts with a
one-dimensional (semi-infinite) array of spatially fixed qubits as it moves along
the array (one can think of this as a one-dimensional version of a Stern-Gerlach
measurement). The qubits fixed at their locations x1, x2, . . . , xn, . . . all begin
with spin-up in the z-direction; when the moving spin passes by one of the fixed
qubits, the two interact by a controlled-not operation; that is, the qubit’s value
is flipped if the moving spin is spin-down and is unchanged if it is spin-up (the
flip will be completed by the time the moving spin moves on to the next position
in the chain). At t0, the moving spin starts at x1; we can represent the states
of each of the regions xi by number states |n↑, n↓〉i for spin in the z-direction.
If the moving spin begins in an equal superposition of spin-up and spin-down,
then the state of the array at t0 will be:
1√
2
(|2, 0〉1 + |1, 1〉1)|1, 0〉2|1, 0〉3 . . . |1, 0〉n . . . ,
that is, a product state of all the regions in the array. At t1, however, as the
moving spin has passed on to position x2, the state becomes:
1√
2
(
|1, 0〉1|2, 0〉2 + |0, 1〉1|1, 1〉2
)
|1, 0〉3 . . . |1, 0〉n . . . ;
regions 1 and 2 are now entangled; and so it continues, until at tn all the regions
up to and including the nth are entangled together:
1√
2
(
|1, 0〉1|1, 0〉2|1, 0〉3 . . . |2, 0〉n + |0, 1〉1|0, 1〉2|0, 1〉3 . . . |1, 1〉n
)
|1, 0〉n+1 . . . .
For sufficiently large n, the magnetisation of the array (the average of the dipole
moments of the spins) will count as a macroscopic variable recording the value
of spin possessed by the measured system. If we were to take the union of the
regions x1 to xn−1 at tn as our region A, for example, and P̂ 1 and P̂−1 to be
projectors onto states with magnetisation of A close to 1 and -1 respectively,
then the state of A will be:
ρ̂A =
1
2
P̂ 1 +
1
2
P̂−1; (15)
corresponding to separate, determinate, values of the pointer variable.
10 Conclusion
We have seen that a superior alternative to wave-function realism is available
when trying to understand the nature of the quantum state. While both the
approaches we have discussed exploit the gains in intelligibility that finding a
spatial arena confers, by choosing spacetime as the arena, we gain a univocal
ontological picture for all standard types of quantum theory (non-relativistic
fixed particle number; non-relativistic variable particle number; relativistic;
field-theoretic) and we avoid artificially picking out certain classes of observ-
ables as preferred. While the kinds of property that will be attributed to a
spacetime region by the assignment to it of a density operator are not ones with
which we are terribly familiar, we have suggested that this kind of feature is
generic in fundamental physics: the case, we have suggested, does not differ in
principle from the unfamiliarity of the electromagnetic field. Our understand-
ing of the nature of these properties will, in the end, have to be mediated by
our becoming familiar with their role within the theory. We sketched, finally,
an—admittedly highly schematic—account of the kind of relation these prop-
erties will have to experience; a form of account which is familiar from recent
discussions of Everettian quantum mechanics.
On the matter of separability, we have suggested that the gains for the
wave-function realist position of being separable at the fundamental level are
not substantial. Non-separable theories seem perfectly intelligible; and when it
comes to considering relativistic covariance, the fact that wave-function realism
fails narratabilty looks mysterious and problematic. By contrast, with a non-
separable spacetime picture, narratability failure is rendered innocuous as a
perfectly natural consequence of adopting a covariant non-separable theory.
On a final note, recall the hierarchy of counterintuitiveness presented in
Section 7. Sticking with purely unitary quantum mechanics keeps us in the
top-half of the heirarchy. But given all of our experience with the notion of
entanglement, we surely can’t expect to move all the way to the top and recover
the full locality of classical physics, while sticking with a theory empirically
equivalent to quantum mechanics. Or can we? This is the question we take up
in Part II.
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